Bucknell University

Bucknell Digital Commons
Faculty Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

12-2020

“Spanish Citizenship and Responsibility for the Past: The Case of
the Sephardim, Moriscos, and Saharawis”
Michael James
mjames@bucknell.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bucknell.edu/fac_journ
Part of the Political Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
James, Michael. "“Spanish Citizenship and Responsibility for the Past: The Case of the Sephardim,
Moriscos, and Saharawis”." (2020) .

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Bucknell Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Bucknell Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact dcadmin@bucknell.edu.

Politics, Groups, and Identities

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpgi20

Spanish citizenship and responsibility for the
past: the case of the Sephardim, Moriscos, and
Saharawis
Michael Rabinder James
To cite this article: Michael Rabinder James (2020): Spanish citizenship and responsibility for the
past: the case of the Sephardim, Moriscos, and Saharawis, Politics, Groups, and Identities, DOI:
10.1080/21565503.2020.1852944
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2020.1852944

Published online: 06 Dec 2020.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 11

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rpgi20

POLITICS, GROUPS, AND IDENTITIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2020.1852944

Spanish citizenship and responsibility for the past: the case of
the Sephardim, Moriscos, and Saharawis
Michael Rabinder James
Social Sciences, Bucknell University, Lewisburg, PA, USA
ABSTRACT

ARTICLE HISTORY

In 2015, Spain passed a law expediting citizenship for the
descendants of the Sephardic Jews expelled in 1492, but not to
the descendants of the Moriscos expelled in 1609. In this essay, I
use Spain’s 2015 citizenship law as a test case for assessing three
normative models for linking citizenship with collective
responsibility for the past: reparations for historic injustice; the
principle of coercively constituted identities; and remedial
responsibility. I argue that the ﬁrst two models confront
intractable philosophical problems that are circumvented by the
third model, remedial responsibility, which prioritizes
contemporary suﬀering and looks to the past only to identify
agents who must provide a remedy. However, remedial
responsibility subordinates the obligation to expedite citizenship
to descendants of the Sephardim and the Moriscos in favor of the
Saharawis, citizens of the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara
who still languish in refugee camps forty years after decolonization.
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In 1492, Columbus sailed the ocean blue. That was on August 2. Four months earlier,
something else happened. Isabel and Fernando, Spain’s so-called Catholic Monarchs,
issued the ﬁnal edict requiring all Jews either to leave the kingdom or to convert to Catholicism. That was on March 31. Three months earlier, something else happened. Those
same Catholic Monarchs entered Granada, the last Muslim-ruled kingdom on the Iberian
Peninsula, completing the Reconquista (reconquest) that brought all of Spain under
uniﬁed Catholic control. That was on January 2. In short, 1492 was an important year
in Spain. Spaniards still remember it as such.
In contrast, 1609 is largely obscure to contemporary Spaniards. However, for a large
minority of Spanish subjects at that time, it was an important year. On April 4, the
Spanish king issued the ﬁnal edict to expel all Moriscos, or Muslim converts to Catholicism. Over the next ﬁve years, 300,000 Moriscos ﬂed the peninsula, dwarﬁng the roughly
50,000 Sephardic Jews who left over a century earlier (Kamen 1997, 23, 227; Bernabé
Pons 2009, 141).
Most contemporary Spaniards would rather forget 2015, the seventh year of Spain’s
economic downturn, replete with 20% unemployment and a sovereign debt crisis.
However, for hundreds of thousands of Sephardic Jews, this was potentially an important
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year, since the Spanish Parliament passed, by a unanimous voice-vote, a law expediting
citizenship to the descendants of all Sephardic Jews expelled back in 1492 (Garea 2015).
Spain’s 1982 citizenship law already eased the naturalization of descendants of Sephardic
Jews, who, along with immigrants from adjacent Iberian states and former Spanish colonies, could acquire citizenship after only two years of residence in Spain, as opposed to
the ten-year residency requirement demanded of all other immigrants, including those
from Morocco (Gutiérrez Calvo 2014). The new law, in contrast, eliminated any residency requirement for descendants of expelled Sephardim, so long as they could
certify their Iberian lineage and cultural connection, and pass tests covering contemporary Spanish language, laws and customs (González 2016). Such a generous citizenship
policy was never extended to the descendants of the Moriscos, most of whom ended
up in Morocco. This diﬀerential treatment bears a signiﬁcant contemporary eﬀect,
since unlike the Sephardic diaspora, Morocco constitutes a large source of contemporary
Spanish immigrants, both regular and irregular, due to its proximity to and relative
poverty compared with Spain.
In this essay, I use Spain’s 2015 citizenship law as a test case for assessing three liberal
models for linking citizenship with collective responsibility for the past: reparations for
historic injustice; the principle of coercively constituted identities; and remedial responsibility.1 After ﬁrst surveying contemporary justiﬁcations and criticisms of the 2015 citizenship law, I then probe the historical record in order to identify coercive minority identity
suppression, not mere expulsion, as the fundamental injustice imposed on religious and
ethnic minorities in early modern Spain. This reading of history reveals that the ﬁrst two
models, reparations for historic injustice and the principle of coercively constituted identities, confront intractable philosophical problems that are circumvented by the third
model, remedial responsibility, which prioritizes contemporary suﬀering and looks to
the past only to identify agents who must provide a remedy. Focusing on remedial
responsibility, however, weakens the case for a blanket extension of citizenship to descendants of either the Sephardim or the Moriscos, while strengthening the case of such a
policy for the Saharawis, stateless inhabitants of Spain’s former colony of Western
Sahara, whose plight received only scant attention during the parliamentary and
public debates over the 2015 citizenship law.
To facilitate a comparative assessment of these three models, I will assume the philosophical coherence of collective, diachronic responsibility, or the idea that a group of
people can bear responsibility for injustices committed by those understood to be
their collective ancestors. This is a philosophically nettlesome issue that raises questions
about individual versus collective responsibility, whether the nation or the state is the
proper locus of collective responsibility, and whether responsibility can be inherited by
future generations (see Kukathas 2003; Lippert-Rasmussen 2009; Miller 2007; SpinnerHalev 2012). However, the speciﬁc case of the 2015 citizenship law merits circumventing
it, since the Spanish legislature unanimously and voluntarily accepted diachronic, collective responsibility for the decision of the Spanish Monarchy in 1492 to expel the Sephardim. Its decision not to extend expedited citizenship to the descendants of the Moriscos
expelled in 1609 or to the Saharawis abandoned in 1976 had nothing to do with any
general rejection of diachronic, collective responsibility, but rather to the Spanish government’s own substantive justiﬁcations for preferring the Sephardim. It is to these justiﬁcations that we will now turn.2
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1. Contemporary justiﬁcations for the 2015 Sephardic citizenship law
Contemporary Spain can reasonably be understood as a polity that adheres to liberaldemocratic norms of justice, such as freedom of conscience, religious toleration, equality
before the law, and protections for minority linguistic groups. It is in this context that the
Spanish government approved and justiﬁed its decision to expedite citizenship for the
descendants of the expelled Sephardim but not of the expelled Moriscos. In contrast,
post-Reconquista Spain was illiberal, undemocratic, and deeply anti-Semitic and Islamaphobic, and most of its Catholic members felt fully justiﬁed in expelling the Sephardim
and Moriscos and coercively suppressing their religious or ethnic identities. Although
contemporary Spain no longer practices such illiberal policies, its government decided
to facilitate the naturalization of descendants of the Sephardim but not the Moriscos.
And as suggested by its passage via an open, voice-vote, this decision provoked little controversy among lawmakers and the broader public.
Spanish oﬃcials proﬀered two justiﬁcations for the law. The dominant justiﬁcation
framed it as a reparation for past historic injustice. When proposing the law in 2012,
Justice Minister Alberto Ruiz-Gallardón described it as a recompense to those Jews
“who had been unjustly deprived of their nationality” (El Pais 2012).3 After its passage
in 2015, Gallardón and Exterior Minister Rafael Catalá jointly depicted it as a means
to “repair an injustice from 500 years ago” (Garea 2015). Spanish King Felipe VI similarly
invoked the reparations frame, stating that Spain “shares the horror of the victims of the
absurd and cruel sacriﬁce of the Sephardim” (Alberola 2016). This frame also appeared in
statements given by Sephardic leaders, such as Mario Eduardo Cohen, who viewed the
law as “an act of historic reparation for a tragic and serious error” (Minder 2015).
However, representatives of descendants of expelled Moriscos also invoked the
reparations frame to challenge their exclusion from the law. Riay Tatary of the Islamic
Commission of Spain, viewed the law as “a very good gesture of justice towards the
Sephardim. But we want justice as well” (Gutiérrez Calvo 2014). Similarly, Muhammad
Escudero Uribe of Spain’s Islamic Council emphasized that “the cause and historical
background is the same. And for this we want this same right to be extended. From a
legal standpoint, it’s only just.” Most pointed was the criticism levelled by Najib Loubaris,
President of the Association for the Memory of the Andalusians, who demanded that the
Spanish government “should grant the same rights to all those who were expelled. Otherwise the decision is selective, not to mention racist” (Kassam 2014).
In response to such criticisms, Spain’s Deputy Minister of Justice, Juan Bravo,
defended the preference given to the Sephardim by citing their maintenance of a Hispanic linguistic culture following their expulsion. Although both groups were expelled,
Bravo emphasized that only the descendants of the Sephardim “maintained the signs
of identity that recall their condition,” speciﬁcally citing their retention of Ladino, the
Sephardic language closely related to Spanish. Conversely, “the Moriscos assimilated
into the culture of the places where they settled after their expulsion. They disappeared
as communities with a common origin.” As a result, Bravo concluded that the law is a
response to “not simply expulsion, but rather the maintenance of links with Spain and
Spanish culture” (Gutiérrez Calvo 2014).
In fairness, this linguistic-cultural justiﬁcation had been invoked previously. In introducing the law in 2012, Justice Minister Gallardón highlighted how descendants of the
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Sephardim “had recreated through aﬀect a Spain that they never lost,” while one of the
objectives of the law cited by Exterior Minister García-Margallo was to “recover the
memory of the Spain that was silenced for such a long time” (El Pais 2012). Nevertheless,
this justiﬁcation remains contradictory in its application. In order to acquire Spanish citizenship, Sephardic applicants must pass a test of comprehension of contemporary Spanish,
not Ladino. As Karen Gerson Sarhon, Coordinator of the Center for Sephardim in Istanbul, pointed out, although Ladino and contemporary Spanish are mutually understandable orally, “there are big diﬀerences in their written translation.” The contradiction,
she emphasized, is that while Spain praises the Sephardim for maintaining their Hispanic
culture for more than ﬁve centuries, the government does not let them pass a language test
in their own version of Spanish (González 2016). Due to this linguistic barrier, along with
the required test covering contemporary Spanish law and customs, only 387 Sephardim
had acquired Spanish citizenship by February of 2017, leading the Spanish government
to waive both tests for Sephardic applicants over the age of 70 (González 2017).
Moreover, descendants of expelled Moriscos also claim to have retained cultural links
to Spain. Although these descendants do not speak a version of Spanish, Loubaris cites
the Spanish inﬂuence on their music, architectural style, clothing, and cuisine (Kassam
2014). Morisco descendants also have family names that are either Spanish (Álvarez,
Aragón) or derived from it (e.g., Loubaris from Olivares or Buano from Bueno).
Tatary, of the Spanish Islamic Commission, even cites Morisco families in North
Africa who keep the keys of the houses that their ancestors abandoned back in Spain
(Gutiérrez Calvo 2014). Moreover, Morisco descendants emphasize that the cultural
inﬂuences go both ways. Today’s Spanish language contains thousands of words
derived from Arabic, such as alcalde (mayor) or alfombra (rug), while some of Spain’s
most distinctive – and most ﬁnancially remunerative – architectural gems, such as Granada’s Alhambra palace or Córdoba’s Mezquita, were built by Muslims (Kassam 2014).
The inconsistent and contradictory invocation of the cultural aﬃnity justiﬁcation
prompts concerns that ulterior motives may animate the preference for the Sephardim
over the Moriscos. Given its passage during Spain’s economic crisis, some suggest
pecuniary interests lie behind the law. Israeli writer Michael Freund ﬁnds it “decidedly
ironic” that “the Expulsion happened in part because Spain wanted the Jews’ assets,
and now they are welcoming Jews back for the same reason” (Freund 2014). Less cynically, Jorge Fuentes, director of the Israelite Circle of Santiago, Chile, suggests that the
citizenship law would “really help multiply commercial links” between Spain and Latin
American countries with signiﬁcant Sephardic communities (Minder 2015). Alternatively, Islamophobia and prejudice against racialized Moroccan immigrants could also
animate the diﬀerential treatment, as suggested above by Najib Labouris.
However, we need not speculate about the hidden motives of the Spanish government in
order to challenge its justiﬁcations for preferring the Sephardim over the Moriscos. We can
simply look back to the situation faced by both groups in early modern, post-Reconquista
Spain, since from a contemporary liberal-democratic perspective, the perspective from
which we must evaluate the 2015 citizenship law, both groups suﬀered the same fundamental injustice. By fundamental injustice, I mean a broader scheme of injustice that encompasses smaller, albeit still abhorrent, instances of injustice. In the context of early modern
Spain, expulsion was but one component of the broader, fundamental injustice faced by
Muslims, Jews, and converts: coercive minority-identity suppression. While Catholic
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Spaniards back then widely, though not universally, considered this policy wise and just,
today’s Spaniards would clearly repudiate it as a violation of liberal-democratic norms.
As a result, if contemporary Spaniards wish to justify any law meant to repair the injustice
suﬀered by the Sephardim or Moriscos half a millennium ago, they must do so in light of the
fundamental injustice that, from today’s perspective, members of those groups faced.

2. The fundamental injustice of coercive minority-identity suppression
Both defenders and critics of the 2015 citizenship law cite expulsion as the injustice that
requires reparation. But the edicts of expulsion applied to the Sephardim in 1492 and the
Moriscos in 1609 were merely part of the fundamental injustice of coercive minority-identity suppression, which preceded and followed the expulsions. This broader scheme had
two forms. The ﬁrst form was a coercively imposed choice either to convert to Catholicism
or to face expulsion or punishment up to death. The second form might be called postconversion identity suppression, since it targeted converted Jews (known as Coversos) and
converted Muslims (Moriscos) even after they chose to adopt the Catholic faith.
Let us begin with the Sephardic subjection to coercively imposed choice. Although antiJewish legislation and violence in Iberia can be traced back to the sixth century (Netanhayu 1996, 34–40), the 1391 wave of pogroms in Southern Spain initiated the ultimate
phase of Jewish oppression. Despite the killing of hundreds of Jews and the destruction
of major Jewish ghettoes, these pogroms are most distinctive for the high proportion of
Jews who chose conversion over death (Gerber 1993, 114). The coercively enforced
choice to convert sharply reduced the Sephardic population and created a new group
of formerly Jewish “New Christians” or Conversos. Nearly a century later, the descendants of Jews who refused conversion were themselves forced to choose between conversion and expulsion from jurisdictions of Catholic Spain with large Converso populations,
in order to minimize any religious inﬂuence they could have on their former co-religionists. The failure of these internal expulsions to settle such concerns led to the 1492 Edict
of Expulsion, which coercively imposed the choice to either convert or leave Spain
entirely. About half of the 80,000 practicing Jews still in Spain at the time chose to
convert rather than leave, due to the risks of the sea voyage and the ﬁnancial costs of
expulsion. Indeed, conversion rather than expulsion may have been the primary motivation behind the edict, leading Henry Kamen to conclude: “The edict did not seek to
expel a people, but to eliminate a religion” (1997, 22).
But even the eﬀective elimination of Judaism from Spain did not end the broader
policy of coercive minority identity suppression. Conversos, even after adopting the
Catholic faith, continued to suﬀer post-conversion identity suppression, most prominently
through the Spanish Inquisition, which was established in 1480 ostensibly to root out
Judaizing, or the secret practice of the Jewish faith. Although the original Conversos
forced to adopt Catholicism in 1391 were likely insincere in their new faith, substantial
evidence suggests that by 1480, the great majority of their descendants, now two generations removed from forced conversion, were actually sincere Christians who inadvertently retained Sephardic linguistic and cultural practices (Netanyahu 1996). This
suggests that the Inquisition stemmed from resentment over Conversos’ wealth, noble
titles, and tendency to claim a superior identity as the people who shared not only the
faith but also the ethnic lineage of Jesus (Kamen 1997, 42–45).
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But while most members of the original Converso communities had become sincere
Catholics, the second wave of conversions prompted by the ﬁfteenth century edicts of
expulsion created a new cohort of Conversos, whose religious sincerity could be more
validly questioned (Kamen 1997, 64). As a result, descendants of Jews were subject to
a new form of coercive minority identity suppression, which diﬀered from its 1391 and
1492 antecedents by eliminating conversion as a viable choice, since they had already
converted to Catholicism. Instead, they were forced to admit to engaging in practices
that violated Catholic norms, and even after doing so were punished ﬁnancially (by
the seizure of their assets), socially (by stigmatization and shame), and physically
(through torture or execution by burning).
Post-conversion identity-suppression was also manifest in rules of limpieza de sangre, or
blood purity, which excluded any individual tainted by Jewish or Muslim heritage from
certain Catholic religious orders and educational institutions (Kamen 1997, 231). Importantly, this exclusion reﬂected not simply religious intolerance but an early form of
modern racism (Frederickson 2002, 31–35). Limpieza eventually faded away in most
of Spain by the late seventeenth century, primarily because the broader policy of coercive
minority-identity suppression succeeded. Conversos were largely integrated into a
broader Catholic Spanish identity, and most of them felt no aﬃnity with their distant
origins (Kamen 1997, 284). As a result, contemporary Spain does not really contain a
broad, Converso identity group, and its roughly 50,000 practicing Jews mainly stem
from immigrants from North Africa, Latin America, and the rest of Europe. In short,
the policy of coercive minority-identity suppression was a smashing success.
Coercive minority-identity suppression also succeeded with respect to Muslims and
Moriscos. Although some defend the expulsion of the Moriscos as the decolonization
of Spain by foreign invaders, we must recall that parts of the Iberian Peninsula were
under Muslim rule for nearly seven centuries, longer than the period of European or
white control over North America. As a result, Iberia contained hundreds of thousands
of Muslim commoners, who held no political oﬃce, often lived under Christian rulers,
and thus formed as much a part of the Iberian society as did Jews and Christians
(Bernabé Pons 2009, 17).
The Catholic Reconquista, completed in 1492 with the fall of Granada, fundamentally
changed this. The oﬃcial terms of surrender were generous, allowing the Muslims to
retain their religion, customs, and Arabic language. Initial eﬀorts at conversion
roughly complied with John Locke’s model of “peaceful persuasion” (Locke [1685]
1983, 30), whereby Catholic priests sought to win over converts by engaging in theological debates, expressing an appreciation for their culture, and conducting Catholic
masses in Arabic. But because this approach produced few converts, the coercively
imposed binary choice of convert or face punishment was adopted in 1499, with subsequent mass baptisms and the conversion of mosques to churches. This led to a
Muslim revolt in Granada, which was met by a harsh response, this time the coercive
trinary choice of conversion or punishment or expulsion. The result was the forced conversion of Granada’s entire Muslim population, save for a small minority who were allowed
to emigrate. The apparent success of this strategy led to its adoption in Castilla in 1502,
where most Muslims chose conversion over expulsion or punishment (Kamen 1997,
214–215; Bernabé Pons 2009, 20–31). Eventually, a coercive binary choice of conversion
or punishment up to death was imposed on the entire Spanish kingdom in 1525.
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The forcibly converted Muslims now oﬃcially became Christian Moriscos, who like
the Conversos became subject to post-conversion identity suppression. In Granada, local
oﬃcials suppressed Morisco cultural identity by burning Arabic books and prohibiting
spoken Arabic, traditional Moorish clothing, the ritual slaughter of animals, and circumcision. Exogamous marriages between Moriscos and Old Christians were also legally
encouraged. In other parts of Spain, the Inquisition burned all books written in
aljamía, a form of Spanish written in Arabic, thinking that they were Korans (Kamen
1997, 215–218; Bernabé Pons 2009, 27, 34–36, 52–56).
Unsurprisingly, post-conversion identity suppression sparked a revolt by the Moriscos
in Granada, which was suppressed only after 30% of the Morisco population were killed
(Bernabé Pons 2009, 44). Of those left alive, 80,000 were expelled from Granada and sent
to other parts of Spain, while thousands were enslaved. Fears of a Morisco ﬁfth column
allied with foreign powers like Turkey led to further post-conversion identity suppression
via the Inquisition, with Moriscos constituting 82% of its prosecutions in Granada
(Kamen 1997, 215, 223–226; Bernabé Pons 2009, 44, 62–64). Anti-Morisco anxieties
spread to other parts of Spain, eventually leading to the 1609 expulsion edict. By 1614,
300,000 Moriscos were forced out of Spain. Choice, perhaps, remained for the Moriscos.
But because they were already converted to Catholicism, the binary choice faced by Jews
in 1492 of conversion or expulsion was no longer operative. Instead, the Moriscos faced
the diﬀerent binary choice of punishment or emigration (Kamen 1997, 227–229).

3. Reparations for historic injustice
Recall that the point of this brief turn to history is not to justify or condemn the Spanish
Catholic monarchy for its policies of coercive minority-identity suppression, either
through coercively imposed religious choice or post-conversion identity suppression.
Rather, the point is to evaluate the decision by the Spanish government in 2015 to
grant expedited citizenship only to the descendants of expelled Jews. Reparations for historic injustice constitutes the most common framework for both justifying this law and
criticizing its exclusion of Morisco descendants.
The framework of reparations has most famously been applied to the case of African
Americans who suﬀered enslavement, de jure and de facto segregation, and ongoing
racial discrimination and social disadvantage in the United States. The descendants of
the Sephardim and the Moriscos diﬀer from African Americans in at least two important
ways. First, African Americans remain members of political community that enslaved
and formally segregated them in the past. In contrast, the descendants of the expelled
Sephardim and Moriscos are members of polities other than Spain. Second, African
Americans continue to suﬀer forms of oppression and disadvantage at the hands of
the United States. Conversely, whereas the Sephardim and Moriscos of early modern
Spain certainly suﬀered oppression in the form of coercive minority identity suppression,
it is doubtful their twenty-ﬁrst-century descendants suﬀer oppression at the hands of the
Spanish state due to their inherited identities. These key diﬀerences between the situations faced by the descendants of African American slaves versus the descendants of
expelled Sephardim and Moriscos limits the types of reparations arguments applicable
to the latter.
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There are at least three models of reparations. The classic “tort model” is a form of
rectiﬁcatory justice that seeks to compensate the descendants of victims of an injustice
that has occurred in the past (Valls 2007, 124; Valls 2018, 23). As I will explain below,
this model confronts certain diﬃculties when applied to the descendants of the expelled
Sephardim and Moriscos, but for now let me brieﬂy turn to two alternative reparations
frameworks, in order to show why they cannot apply to the case of the descendants of the
expelled Sephardim and Moriscos.
The political argument for reparations turns away from a strict concern with rectifying
past injustices in favor of reforming contemporary political relations. Thus, Balfour
(2014) reformulates the argument for reparations for American slavery and segregation
as a means of reforming American democracy rather than combating economic injustice.
This democracy over justice model, however, is less well suited to grounding a claims to
Spanish citizenship, since the descendants of the Sephardim and Moriscos, unlike
African Americans, are not members of the Spanish state they may wish to join. As a
result, they lack the existing type of democratic political relations that Balfour’s model
of reparations seeks to improve.
The fact that the descendants of African American slaves continue to suﬀer oppression
today obviates the application of a third model of “reparations for the future.” As
suggested by Wenar (2006), this model seeks reparations not just to remedy a past injustice but to combat present injustice and achieve future justice for African Americans (and
others) who continue to suﬀer based on their identities as descendants of past injustice.
The problem for the Spanish case is that while the early modern Spanish state clearly did
oppress Sephardim and Moriscos (along with Coversos and Muslims) due to their identities, it does not today engage in identity-based oppression of their descendants, who live
in other countries. It is true that some descendants of Sephardim and Moriscos in other
countries may trace present deprivations to the expulsion of their ancestors from Spain,
but these claims derive from the past actions of the Spanish state, not present ones. Consequently, reparations for the future works ﬁt poorly the case of the Sephardim and Moriscos, even though it is promising in the case of African Americans.
As a result, the “tort model” of reparations, which is the version clearly alluded to by
defenders and critics of the 2015 Spanish citizenship law, is the only one that ﬁts the case
of the Sephardim and Moriscos. The “tort model” analytically comprises three components: a wrongdoer (W), who commits an unjust act (Au), thereby injuring a victim
(V). Understood as a form of rectiﬁcatory justice, the tort model requires that V be
returned to the status quo ex ante prior to Au, through either restitution of some good
or commensurate compensation. Because W bears moral responsibility for committing
Au, the absolute or even relative wellbeing of V is irrelevant: even if V were much
richer than W, the latter would still owe restitution or compensation for Au. Applying
the tort model to reparations for historic injustice normally raises diﬃcult questions
regarding the diachronic collective responsibility of later generations. But as I mentioned
earlier, the case of Spain’s Sephardic citizenship law allows us to circumvent such questions, since Spain’s government voluntarily accepted responsibility for providing reparations to the descendants of the Sephardim expelled in 1492, even as it evaded such
responsibility for descendants of the Moriscos expelled in 1609. Nevertheless, other
diﬃcult issues confront the reparations framework in this case.
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The ﬁrst problem is correctly identifying Au, the unjust act requiring reparation. Both
defenders and critics of the 2015 Sephardic citizenship law understand Au as the expulsion of the Sephardim and the Moriscos. But from a contemporary liberal-democratic
perspective, Au is more accurately understood as the fundamental injustice embodied
by the entire policy of coercive minority-identity suppression adopted by the Spanish
state during the early modern period. To reinforce this point, imagine that we could
turn back the clock and rescind the two edicts ordering the expulsion of the Sephardim
in 1492 and the Moriscos in 1609. In this scenario, would the Sephardim and Moriscos
have been able to maintain their distinct religious or cultural identities in the manner
expected by liberal-democratic justice? Almost certainly not, since the Sephardim and
Moriscos who did not to emigrate suﬀered post-conversion identity suppression under
the Inquisition, limpieza de sangre rules, language prohibitions, and even inducements
towards miscegenation with Old Christians. As a result, descendants of those who
stayed were assimilated into mainstream Spanish Catholic identities and remain indistinguishable from other contemporary Spaniards (Pita 2014). Seen in this light, reparations
for minorities in early modern Spain should identify Au as the entire policy of coercive
minority-identity suppression, of which expulsion represents only one part.
Correctly identifying Au leads to the second, generalization problem. If contemporary
liberal-democrats identify Au as all forms of coercive minority-identity suppression,
reparations are owed to at least ﬁve distinct sets of victims of fundamental injustice.
(1) Those forced to emigrate under the coercive choice of emigrate or convert (Sephardim) or emigrate or be punished (Moriscos). (2) Those forced to convert to Catholicism
under the similar coercive choices of convert or emigrate or be punished (Sephardim and
Muslims). (3) Those punished or killed rather than converting under the illiberal choices
described above. (4) Those forced to abandon their distinct ethnic or cultural identity
through post-conversion identity suppression (Conversos and Moriscos). (5) Those punished or killed while trying to maintain their distinct identities in spite of post-conversion
identity suppression. Both defenders and critics of the 2015 Sephardic citizenship law
cognize victims only in set (1), completely overlooking victims in the other four sets.
Perhaps pragmatic reasons justify focusing only on victims in set (1), since they lived
to procreate descendants who might be identiﬁable as Sephardic or Morisco today. Conversely, descendants of other victims either do not exist, if their ancestors in sets (3) and
(5) were killed prior to possible conception, or if they do exist, they are now almost completely indistinguishable from other Spaniards today, given the profound eﬃcacy of postconversion identity suppression, the second form of coercive minority-identity suppression. However, is the pragmatic ability to identify descendants a suﬃciently strong justiﬁcation for contemporary Spain to try to compensate them? Victims in set (1) did not
suﬀer a greater injustice than those in sets (2–5). It is hard not to think that those killed in
sets (3) and (5) suﬀered the greatest injustice. So the decision to provide reparation to
descendants of those expelled in set (1) is simply based on the ability to ﬁnd a compensable party today. It is a bit like saying, “We need to compensate somebody, and these are
the only ones we can ﬁnd.” But one could also ask, “Why compensate anybody, given the
wide variety of victims?”
Indeed, this pragmatic justiﬁcation becomes even less compelling when we confront
the third type of problem endemic to reparations arguments. This non-identity
problem states that the speciﬁc descendants or rightful heirs of the original victim V,
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would not exist in their present form absent the unjust act Au. Three versions of the nonidentity problem can be distinguished. The individual biological non-identity problem
claims that absent prior unjust act Au, it is all but impossible that the same individual
descendant would have existed, given what we know about the biological processes of
human reproduction. For example, if the unjust act of enslavement did not exist, then
any speciﬁc descendant of a slave would not exist, since it is unlikely that her parents
would have met and procreated. Even if they had met and procreated under some counterfactual circumstance that excluded Au, it is unlikely that the same sperm would have
fecundated the same egg, given the hundreds of millions of sperm contained within a
male ejaculation (Morris 1984, 176–177). A second version of the non-identity
problem occurs on a non-biological, collective level (Morris 1984, 181). The rich
culture produced by African Americans, for instance, would most likely not exist
absent numerous unjust acts such as enslavement or segregation. Similarly, post-colonial
national cultures would not exist absent the unjust acts of colonization (Wenar 2006,
400). We can also identify a third non-identity problem at a non-biological, individual
level. Here, biological individuals would not exist qua members of these collective cultures or identities absent the original unjust act Au.
In each version of the non-identity problem, reparations arguments are confronted
with the fact that the original unjust act (Au) bears not only costs but beneﬁts. As
Andrew Valls puts it in response to the individual-biological non-identity problem, if
we assume that existence is superior to non-existence, then we cannot say that the descendants of slavery are worse oﬀ had slavery not existed (Valls 2018, 25). Non-identity
problems strike defenders of African American reparations as tedious, academic quibbling, given the various injustices suﬀered by African Americans today. However, if
we identify Au as the expulsion of the Sephardim and Moriscos, as most defenders
and critics of the Sephardic citizenship law tend to do, non-identity problems become
more compelling. This is because expulsion, as opposed to execution or forced conversion and assimilation, is precisely what allowed Sephardic and Morisco individuals and
cultural communities to exist today. Let us start with the individual-biological level.
Absent expulsion, the same individual, biological descendants of these groups would
not exist. This is not simply because of indeterminate eﬀects of expulsion on the biological processes of procreation. It is also because the binary choices facing so many Sephardim and Moriscos included punishment up to death as the alternative to emigration.
Victims in set (1) experienced a dramatically greater capacity to beget biological descendants than victims in sets (3) and (5).
Even more apt are the non-biological, non-identity problems. At the collective, nonbiological level, expulsion was a necessary condition for the present existence of a collective Sephardic culture as it exists today. If the Sephardim were denied the option of emigration and were forced to choose between conversion and punishment up to death, their
collective culture would have been eliminated and their biological descendants would
have been coercively assimilated into a broader Spanish Catholic identity. Instead, expulsion has allowed Sephardic culture not only to persist but also to develop: for example,
the sojourn in North Africa, the Middle East, and the Ottoman Empire led the Ladino
language to incorporate Arabic, Turkish, and Bulgarian words (Morales and Pita
2018). Sephardic culture in general, and the Ladino language in particular, exists in its
contemporary form precisely because of the expulsion of the Sephardim in 1492.
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In turn, at the individual, non-biological level it is clear that descendants of the
expelled Sephardim and Moriscos can exist as Sephardim and Moriscos only due to
the expulsion of their ancestors. The descendants of victims forced to abandon their
identities in sets (2) and (4) cannot exist as Sephardim or Moriscos individuals.
Despite attempts to identify contemporary Spanish individuals as descendants of the
Sephardim or Moriscos (Freund 2014), the dispersion of Sephardic and Morisco
genetic markers among the Spanish population renders this eﬀort Quixotic at best
(Pita 2014). The fact of the matter is that today, the descendants of the Sephardim and
Moriscos forced to convert to Catholicism are socially, culturally, economically, and
genetically indistinguishable from the descendants of the Old Christians. So past expulsion is a condition for the existence of individuals capable of identifying as Sephardim
and Moriscos today.
From the above considerations, I ﬁnd reparations argument incoherent not only for
justifying the Sephardic citizenship law but also for criticizing its exclusion of the Moriscos. Doing so fails to identify correctly the fundamentally unjust act Au that merits
reparation, to address the generalization problem faced by other sets of victims of Au,
and to overcome three non-identity problems that are particularly apt in the case of
the descendants of the Sephardim and Moriscos.

4. The principle of coercively constituted identities
Let us now turn to the justiﬁcation given for the 2015 Citizenship Law by Spain’s Deputy
Minister of Justice, Juan Bravo, who claimed that the Sephardim deserved preference
because they, unlike the expelled Moriscos, retained a connection to Spain and
Spanish culture through their maintenance of the Ladino language. While cultural and
linguistic similarly often leads states to prefer certain immigrants over others, it is
unclear whether it grounds a responsibility to do so. Although the government of the
United States might prefer immigrants from predominantly Anglophone, white-dominant, liberal-capitalist countries like the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand, it has no responsibility to do so.
However, could states incur responsibilities to include the linguistically and culturally
similar, if those similarities have resulted from past coercion? Rogers Smith argues as
much through his Principle of Coercively Constituted Identities (PCCI), which holds
that governments may be obligated to grant “partial or full citizenship” to foreign
persons, whose “identities, aspirations, and interests have been coercively constituted
by past and present actions of” these governments (Smith 2015, 220). Smith develops
PCCI in four steps. First, he claims that members of political communities should feel
an obligation to live up to the demands of their ethically constitutive stories. Second,
the ethically constitutive stories of constitutional democracies, in particular, include
“embedded cosmopolitanism,” which aﬃrms the minimal moral worth, dignity, and
capacity for freedom of all human beings, not just their own members. Third, Smith
notes that governmental coercion often involuntarily constitutes the personal, ethical
identities that form the “starting points in formulating their conceptions of the sorts
of free, meaningful lives available to them.” He concludes that the ethically constitutive
stories of constitutional democracies may obligate them “to include as members, all
persons whose identities and aspirations they have coercively shaped” (2015, 223).
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Smith later imposes a pragmatic limit to PCCI, suggesting that these obligations fade
away after “about three generations, roughly two-thirds to three-quarters of a century”
(2015, 253; 2014, 387).
Importantly, Smith distinguishes PCCI from arguments for reparations. Although
compatible with “duties to redress and repair speciﬁc historical injustices,” PCCI
diﬀers by denying the relevance of whether the past exercise of coercion was just or beneﬁcial to the coerced party. The fact of coercive identity constitution alone generates
“obligations to many who have been coerced but to whom no reparations for injustices
are owed” (2008, 140–141; Cf. 2010, 5, 9; 2011, 549; 2015, 234). Consequently, PCCI
avoids the non-identity problems associated with reparations arguments. Even if
today’s descendants of the Sephardim and Moriscos owe their individual biological
lives, their rich collective cultures, and their individual membership within these cultures
to Spanish expulsion, the coercive manner whereby expulsion created their identities
remains suﬃcient reason for receiving Spanish citizenship.
Smith also severs PCCI from considerations of the contemporary welfare of those
seeking citizenship. As a result, Smith draws the “counterintuitive” conclusion that, by
militarily occupying and politically restructuring post-war Japan and Germany, the
United States has exercised greater coercion and incurred greater obligations over the
identities of Japanese and German citizens than over Mexicans, whose country was
merely coercively manipulated over the relevant 75-year timeframe and whose claims
for inclusion thus present a “far more diﬃcult case” (Smith 2008, 149; 2010, 10–11).
The fact that Japan and Germany are wealthy countries whose citizens, according to
some metrics, enjoy a higher quality of life than Americans, is irrelevant, as is the relative
poverty of most contemporary Mexican when compared to their northern counterparts.
The coercive constitution of identity, not the relative or absolute welfare of those subject
to it, is the sole criterion that justiﬁes granting citizenship on preferential terms.
If we relax the pragmatic time limit, PCCI bolsters Bravo’s defense of Spain’s 2015
Citizenship law. Contemporary Spain sees itself as a constitutional democracy committed
to embedded cosmopolitanism, most famously when it claimed to have the universal
legal jurisdiction to prosecute the former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet for violations of human rights. In this way, Spain satisﬁes PCCI’s ﬁrst two conditions.
However, the third step appears tricky, given the ambiguity of its core concept, personal
ethical identity. Smith deﬁnes this as “persons’ senses of their core personal values, purposes, aspirations, and aﬃliations, which may have political, economic, moral, religious,
ethnic, aesthetic, and other dimensions” (2008, 141, Cf. 145). This expansive deﬁnition
lends itself to two competing interpretations, one which would support Bravo’s argument, and one which would not.
On the one hand, we could interpret personal, ethical identity as grounded in a linguistic identity. This interpretation would emphasize how Smith, in deﬁning personal
ethical identity, exclusively cites Will Kymlicka’s inﬂuential book Multicultural Citizenship (cf. Smith 2015, 223). Because Kymlicka provides a liberal argument for protecting
cultures in as much as they facilitate the exercise of individual autonomy, he eschews protections for cultural identities based on thick content, like that of conservative religious
groups with illiberal normative restrictions on women or non-heterosexuals. Instead,
Kymlicka prioritizes the relatively thin “cultural structure” provided by a national
“societal culture” grounded in language and territory (1995, 76–80).
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Although Kymlicka’s model is meant to defend self-government rights for linguistic,
national groups, like Spain’s Catalans, it might also justify granting expedited citizenship
to the Sephardim, given the linguistic connections between the Ladino and Spanish
languages. And though Smith’s theory predates the 2015 Sephardic citizenship law, he
does approvingly cite Spain’s 1982 citizenship law precisely for granting expedited citizenship to linguistically similar Latin American immigrants from Spain’s former colonies
(2014, 387, 391). The fact that this was the ﬁrst citizenship law adopted after Spain’s transition from a fascist dictatorship to a constitutional democracy seemingly bolsters the linguistic interpretation of personal, ethical identity under PCCI.
But note that the 1982 Citizenship law, like its 2015 successor, did not expedite the
naturalization of immigrants from Morocco, who were and still are subject to a tenyear residency prerequisite, in contrast to the two-year requirement for Latin Americans.
The longer residency requirement stood even though Spain had exercised semi-colonial
coercion over parts of northern Morocco from 1912 until 1956. The linguistic interpretation of personal, ethical identity would validate this distinction, since Spanish coercion
was not coupled with a strong imposition of the Spanish language on Moroccans. This
stands in contrast to France, which took greater pains to impose its language on its Moroccan subjects, leading French to be the second language in that country today. Smith
himself cites linguistic imposition under the French mission civilitrice as a reason for contemporary France to favor immigration from its former colonies (Smith 2014).
But if the linguistic understanding of personal, ethical identity draws Smith’s model
closer to the Spanish government’s position favoring the Sephardim, a non-linguistic
interpretation of personal, ethical identity is also possible. Notably, Smith deploys
PCCI to advocate for a more lenient American immigration policy towards immigrants
from Mexico (Smith 2011). Drawing on past examples of American coercion, such as the
annexation of northern Mexico in the nineteenth century and heavy-handed inﬂuence on
Mexican governments in the twentieth century, Smith concludes that the personal,
ethical identities of many Mexican citizens can only ﬁnd fulﬁllment through immigration
to the United States. Whether they speak English or Spanish is never considered. In a
similar vein, one could argue that Spanish coercion led Moroccans to see their nation
as the “colonial Al-Andalus,” a concept originally coined by Spain to justify its Moroccan
protectorate but later adopted by Moroccan nationalists to distinguish their country from
other parts of the Arab world via its architectural and literary connections to the Iberian
peninsula (Calderwood 2018). Even if most of its citizens speak Arabic rather than
Spanish, this history bolsters the non-linguistic interpretation of personal, ethical identity. In this way, PCCI could be deployed to support expedited citizenship for Moroccan
immigrants on the same terms as the Sephardim and Latin Americans. Indeed, if we
enforce Smith’s pragmatic, three-generation limit on PCCI, then Moroccans pose a
stronger claim than the Sephardim or Latin Americans, given Spain’s more recent coercion over their homeland.
But even if this is the case, potential problems confront PCCI. For although PCCI
manages to avoid the non-identity problems associated with the model of reparations,
it still falls prey to the generalization problem. Recall that the reparations model requires
identifying the unjust act (Au) to be rectiﬁed. Whereas the 2015 Citizenship law identiﬁed
expulsion as Au, the latter is better associated with the broader policy of coercive minority
identity suppression. As a result, justifying the 2015 Citizenship law through reparations
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fails to rectify those killed or forced to convert and assimilate, who were thus unable to
beget culturally identiﬁable descendants. In a parallel fashion, using PCCI to justify the
2015 Citizenship law or an alternative that includes Moroccan immigrants similarly
requires identifying a past coercive act (Ac), which can then ground present obligations.
The problem is that PCCI exclusively identiﬁes Ac as coercive acts that constitute a
personal ethical identity. For the Sephardim, Ac is the expulsion that transformed
them into a linguistic-cultural group unmoored from its homeland of Sefarad. For Moroccans, Ac would be the colonial coercion that rendered them children of Al-Andalus.
However, why should we consider coercive identity constitution as more normatively relevant than coercive identity suppression? Recall that most Jews and Muslims in early
modern Spain ended up either dying or converting to Catholicism, under the regime
of coercively imposed religious choice. And even after converting to Catholicism,
these people still suﬀered post-conversion identity suppression. As a result, these
victims either could not beget biological descendants or, if they could, their descendants
are now completely assimilated into contemporary mainstream Spanish identities. In
light of this, why should we normatively prioritize Spanish coercion that led to the formation for Sephardic or Moroccan identities over Spanish coercion that led to the elimination of Converso or Morisco identities? In this way, PCCI, like reparations, falls prey to
the generalization problem. Both theories only generate obligations to the descendants of
the individuals who, arguably, did not suﬀer the greatest eﬀects of past coercion, for the
merely pragmatic reason that these are the only descendants that either exist or can be
identiﬁed. “We need to compensate somebody, and these are the only ones we can ﬁnd.”

5. Remedial responsibility for enduring injustice
So far, I have argued that the tort model of reparations cannot surmount the three versions of the non-identity problem, which in the case of the Sephardic citizenship law,
remain compelling. Although PCCI does circumvent non-identity problems, it still stumbles over the generalization problem, which haunts both models because they generate
obligations only to the descendants of those past historical victims who plausibly did
not suﬀer the greatest injustices or the most extensive coercion. If the majority of Sephardim, Muslims, Conversos, and Moriscos suﬀered fates worse than expulsion, their descendants either do not exist or cannot be identiﬁed due the cruel eﬀectiveness of coercive
minority identity suppression. Seen in this light, the expelled Sephardim and Moriscos
were relatively lucky in being able to beget culturally identiﬁable descendants who can
make claims for citizenship.
This problem arises because reparations and PCCI both derive contemporary obligations from past actions alone (Au, Ac), rather than ﬁrst identifying present injustices.
A more promising alternative is Jeﬀ Spinner-Halev’s concept of enduring injustice,
which avoids the generalization problem by ﬁrst identifying groups who suﬀer injustice
in the present and are likely to do so in the future. Only then should we investigate
whether past historical acts may have contributed to the present injustices in ways that
generate contemporary obligations (2012, 56). This allows us to circumvent the generalization problem by prioritizing the claims of those individuals or groups who suﬀer injustice today over other individuals or groups who either do not exist or do not presently
suﬀer injustice. A concern with enduring injustice seems to animate the model of
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reparations for the future, which begins with an analysis of the present condition of historically oppressed groups within speciﬁc nation-states, such as African Americans (Valls
2007, 2018; Wenar 2006). David Miller’s model of remedial responsibility provides a
similar, forward-looking response to enduring injustice at the global level.
Miller deﬁnes remedial responsibility as “the responsibility we may have to come to
the aid of those who are deprived or suﬀering in some way” (2007, 163). Its normative
baseline is a set of conditions for a minimally decent human life. In terms of global
justice, remedial responsibility focuses on individuals or groups who “fall below some
threshold in terms of material resources, or they are in danger or distress” (98).
Unlike the tort model of reparations or PCCI, remedial responsibility is primarily
forward-looking: the goal is to assign some agent the responsibility to alleviate today’s
suﬀering. The centrality of the contemporary normative baseline – the fact that some
people experience terrible conditions today – justiﬁes ignoring the generalization
problem. Yes, others victims may have suﬀered similar or even greater injuries in the
past, but if those victims have not begotten descendants who suﬀer deprivation today,
their injuries do not generate contemporary obligations or responsibilities. In eﬀect, contemporary deprivation is the necessary condition for contemporary responsibility.
Remedial responsibility may be assigned through both forward-looking and backward-looking criteria (86). Although Miller himself does not rank these criteria, the
forward-looking criterion of capacity clearly remains a necessary, if not suﬃcient,
condition. If a state lacks the resources or the political stability to provide a
remedy, it makes no sense to assign it remedial responsibility (Brooks 2011). But
this does not mean that all wealthy and stable states are equally liable to remedial
responsibility in all cases of suﬀering or distress. In some cases, such as a disaster
precipitated by purely natural causes, remedial responsibility could be assigned to
any capable state, or perhaps to all capable states through a global system of distributing responsibility. But in other cases, remedial responsibilities may be assigned to
those speciﬁc states whose past actions have contributed to the present suﬀering.
Miller identiﬁes three backward-looking criteria for assigning speciﬁc remedial
responsibility. Moral responsibility accrues to those states that willingly and intentionally injured another state or its members. Causal responsibility applies to those states
that directly caused such an injury, even if unintentionally. Outcome responsibility, the
loosest criterion, assigns liability for eﬀects that can be reasonably derived from state
actions (Miller 2007, 86–97).
At ﬁrst blush, the backward-looking criteria for assigning remedial responsibility
resemble the tort model of reparations. But strictly speaking, this is the case only with
moral responsibility, and it clearly does not apply to the loosest standard, outcome
responsibility. Like reparations, outcome responsibility draws on tort law. But whereas
reparations relies on moral responsibility to deal with torts between two persons, a
wrongdoer and a victim, outcome responsibility derives from remedies to ongoing, systemic dangers or injuries. The clearest tort analogy is liability for rear-end crashes, which
accrues to the car that is following, even if its driver took all possible precautions to avoid
crashing into the preceding car. By intentionally taking all necessary precautions, the
driver is not morally culpable. Outcome responsibility also diﬀers from causal responsibility. If a freak drop in temperature suddenly creates a patch of ice that leads me to crash
into the car ahead of me, I remain outcome responsible, even if the primary cause was the
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ice and not my driving. Miller concludes that “outcome responsibility … has a causal
component – the agent must in some way have contributed to producing the
outcome, but outcome responsibility needs to be distinguished from causal responsibility
as such” (86). The urgency of establishing a remedial agent for the recurring, systemic
problem of rear-end crashes justiﬁes tort law’s looser standard of outcome responsibility,
as opposed to the stricter standards of moral or causal responsibility. Similarly, the
urgency of addressing severe deprivation justiﬁes assigning remedial responsibility
through outcome responsibility.
Two criticisms of remedial responsibility should be addressed at this point. The ﬁrst is
whether deprivation or distress is too modest a standard for remedial responsibility
(Holtug 2011; Cf. Miller 2011). Why can we not assign remedial responsibilities for realizing global equality of opportunity or a global diﬀerence principle? This criticism cuts
to the heart of debates in global justice, which need not be resolved here, since the pertinent point for the present argument is that claims for citizenship lodged by individuals or
groups suﬀering absolute deprivation or distress should take priority over claims lodged
by those who are doing well or decently. In this way, remedial responsibility, unlike
reparations or PCCI, allows us to avoid the generalization problem.
But even if we accept the priority of the worst oﬀ, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen questions whether latter generations can be assigned remedial responsibility for outcomes
over which they lack control (2009, 111). Since present Spaniards had no control over
the decision to impose coercive minority identity suppression nearly half a millennium
ago, why should they bear any responsibility for remedying the eﬀects of those policies on
descendants of the Sephardim, Moriscos, or others. However, control is more relevant to
moral or causal responsibility than to remedial responsibility more broadly, which can
accrue to people simply by the beneﬁts that they receive from past or present collective
actions. If my father bequeaths me a car which he stole, unbeknownst to me, I still bear
the remedial responsibility to return the car once its provenance is revealed, even though
I had no control over its illegal acquisition, since it is a beneﬁt that I have acquired
through a wrongful act.
Lippert-Rasmussen challenges the importance of beneﬁts, by claiming that an
American opposed to the Iraq War who received unemployment beneﬁts is no
more outcome responsible than a similar American who, due to a bureaucratic
error, was unjustly deprived of unemployment beneﬁts (2009, 121). However, both
Americans still enjoy a multitude of beneﬁts from membership in this political community, even if one of them was improperly deprived of one speciﬁc beneﬁt. They
thus retain outcome responsibility, for example by having their tax dollars diverted
to post-war reconstruction eﬀorts, even if neither of them should be held morally
or even causally responsible. Similarly, because contemporary Spaniards enjoy
beneﬁts from membership in the Spanish state that emerged from the Reconquista
in 1492, they remain outcome responsible for contemporary deprivations stemming
from its past actions, even if they are not morally or causally responsible. And as I
mentioned earlier, because the legislature of the Spanish state voluntarily and unanimously accepted collective, diachronic responsibility for its actions towards the
Sephardim but not the Moriscos or the Saharawis, this lack of control critique of
remedial responsibility seems inapposite in this case.
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6. Remedial responsibility and Spain’s Sephardim, Moriscos, and
Saharawis
Assessing citizenship claims through remedial responsibility would transform the debate
over Spain’s 2015 Citizenship law. Instead of past instances of injustice or coercion, our
focus would turn ﬁrst to those individuals or groups whose contemporary deprivation or
distress can be traced to the past actions of the Spanish state. Unless they faced material
deprivation or social threat, descendants of expelled Sephardim or Moriscos, would lack
any compelling claim to Spanish citizenship. The potential Sephardic investors alluded to
by Freund and Fuentes earlier would not have a strong claim, nor would potential Moroccan investors. A better claim could be levelled by Moroccans suﬀering absolute
poverty, or Sephardim ﬂeeing anti-Semitism in Venezuela, Turkey, or even the United
States (Yeginsu 2015; Sokol 2015; Romero 2018). But because the latter two countries
possess the capacity to combat domestic anti-Semitism, they would retain primary remedial responsibility, not Spain. Conversely, if unstable Venezuela lacks the capacity to
protect its Sephardim, remedial responsibility may fall to Spain.
Because the model of remedial responsibility avoids the generalization problem
through reference to contemporary suﬀering or distress, successful claims for Spanish citizenship would have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Although this may require analyzing individual claims, well-deﬁned collective cases could also succeed, if all members of
the class suﬀer distress or deprivation that can be traced to previous actions of the Spanish
government. However, a blanket extension of Spanish citizenship to all descendants of the
Sephardim and the Moriscos would not be justiﬁed, given the disparate circumstances
facing members of these groups. Conversely, a stronger, collective case for remedial citizenship can be made for an entire group barely mentioned in the debates over the 2015
Citizenship law, the Saharawis, stateless refugees from Western Sahara.
When Spain haphazardly abandoned this African colony in 1976, it was quickly
invaded by Morocco and Mauritania, even as the Frente Polisario, a Western Saharan
nationalist force, also sought control. Within months, roughly half of the Saharawi population ﬂed to southwestern Algeria, where they and their descendants remain in refugee
camps today. Despite Polisario’s eﬀorts to create a state without territory inside the
camps, many Sawaharis seek to emigrate, legally and illegally, in search of better opportunities (San Martín 2010; Boum 2013).
The Saharawis are the quintessential example of a group that suﬀers enduring injustice. Not only their present but also their future looks bleak, given the political impasse
between Morocco and Polisario, whose main ally is Algeria. The pressing questions are
what could constitute a remedy, and who bears responsibility for providing it. The ideal
remedy would be a political solution – either an independent Saharawi state or an autonomous Saharawi region within Morocco (San Martín 2010, 6; Gabriel and Holley 2013;
Zartman 2013). But because a political resolution is unlikely any time soon, a second-best
remedy would be to help those Saharawis who wish to migrate and acquire citizenship in
other countries. According to the framework of remedial responsibility, the country that
should welcome the largest number of Saharawis is Spain. Spain’s economic development
and political stability grant it the capacity to take in many Saharawi refugees, while its
historical relationship with Western Sahara reveals at least outcome responsibility for
their plight.
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Spain was granted much of Western Sahara’s territory as a “protectorate” in 1884. It
began exercising direct coercive control in the 1930s and exploiting its primary resource,
phosphate, through industrial development and Spanish settlement in the 1940s, leading
this territory to become a full-ﬂedged Spanish province in 1958 (San Martín 2010, 22, 31,
50–54). An anti-colonial reaction emerged as many Saharawis joined the Moroccan anticolonial Liberation Army, whose uprising was violently suppressed by Spanish and
French military action. Ironically, if the Liberation Army had won, Western Sahara
would have simply been incorporated into Morocco, and the present controversy might
not have arisen. But because Spain’s victory led to greater control over the territory, the
ﬁrst Saharawi nationalist movement, Harakat Tahrir, emerged. Although it sought only
gradual independence under Spanish tutelage, it was violently suppressed, leading Saharawi nationalists to adopt armed struggle under the banner of the Frente Polisario in 1973
(San Martín 2010, 70–86; King 2013). Although Spain had agreed to conduct a Saharawi
self-determination referendum prior to departing, it instead simply withdrew its troops in
1976 and handed over temporary administrative control of the territory to Morocco and
Mauritania, who consequently invaded (San Martín 2010, 102–107; King 2013). Although
Spain granted the Saharawis the opportunity to claim Spanish citizenship, the deadline for
applying lasted only one year. That short window, combined with the chaos amidst the
conﬂict between Moroccan, Mauritania, and the Frente Polisaro, precluded any meaningful opportunity for most Saharawis to apply for Spanish citizenship.
In light of this history, we can assign to Spain the brunt of remedial responsibility for
alleviating the suﬀering of Saharawi refugees by expediting their immigration and citizenship. Spain’s colonization, repression, and botched decolonization provide evidence of
outcome responsibility, and perhaps also moral and causal responsibility. Moreover,
Spanish coercion strongly inﬂuenced the formation of a Saharawi national identity, distinct from Moroccan identity. Whereas Smith’s theory of PCCI would claim that this
fact alone justiﬁes granting Spanish citizenship to the Saharawis, regardless of their contemporary plight, the model of remedial responsibility sees Spain’s coercive constitution
of Saharawi identity as important because it hinders resolution of the conﬂict, thereby contributing to their present suﬀering and imposing greater outcome responsibility upon
Spain.
Of course, other countries may also bear remedial responsibility. Morocco and Mauritania invaded Western Sahara upon Spain’s withdrawal, but their relative poverty
hinders their capacity for absorbing Saharawi refugees. Remedial responsibility could
also accrue to France and the United States, two capable states that lent diplomatic
support to Morocco, its Cold War ally, during the time of the invasion (San Martín
2010, 104–105; Gabriel and Holley 2013; Tisseron 2013). Yet their outcome responsibility
for the Saharawi condition pales in comparison with that of Spain. For these reasons, the
model of remedial responsibility bolsters the position of jurist Manuel Peña Bernaldo de
Quirós, who condemned the 2015 law for favoring the Sephardim over the Saharawis, the
group most in need of Spanish citizenship (Gutiérrez Calvo 2014; Minder 2015).

7. Conclusion
In this essay, I have used the case of Spain’s 2015 citizenship law, which granted expedited citizenship to the descendants of the expelled Sephardim but not to the descendants
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of the expelled Moriscos nor to the formerly colonized Saharawis, in order to elucidate
the strengths and weaknesses of three models of responsibility for the past. I have argued
that intractable philosophical problems confront the two frameworks most closely associated with the Spanish government’s justiﬁcations for the law – the model of reparations
for past injustice and the principle of coercively constituted identities (PCCI).
The reparations model cannot surmount non-identity problems, whereby the injustice
to be rectiﬁed, the expulsion of the Sephardim in 1492, itself created beneﬁts to the descendants, such as the biological existence of the individual descendants of the Sephardim,
the collective existence of Sephardic culture, and the capacity for individuals to identify as
Sephardic. These non-identity problems also apply to the descendants of the expelled
Moriscos, and as a result, simply extending citizenship to them does not surmount the
broader philosophical problems associated with the reparations model.
While PCCI can avoid non-identity problems because it disregards possible beneﬁts as
irrelevant, it cannot avoid the generalization problem, whereby only descendants of the
expelled Sephardim and Moriscos are cognized as worthy of normative attention, while
those Sephardic and Morisco individuals who were either forced to assimilate into a
Spanish Catholic identity or were killed while resisting assimilation are completely overlooked. Like the reparations model, PCCI cannot overcome intractable philosophical
problems because it focuses its attention only on the past actions of the Spanish government, which generated far more victims than those who can be identiﬁed and recompensed today.
In contrast, the model of remedial responsibility begins with the enduring injustice
facing individuals or groups today. Contemporary deprivation or distress justiﬁes the
remedial model’s focus on some individuals or groups (those suﬀering today), while
ignoring others (those who are not suﬀering), thereby circumventing the generalization
problem. Moreover, the initial focus on contemporary suﬀering overrides the relatively
minor beneﬁts that lead to non-identity problems. Only after having identiﬁed which
individuals or groups are suﬀering today does the remedial model then seek to assign
responsibility to those actors who in the past have contributed to the present suﬀering
and thus bear outcome responsibility for providing a remedy, so long as they are
capable of providing one.
Consequently, the remedial responsibility model requires a case-by-case assessment of
claims to Spanish citizenship. Only those Sephardic or Morisco individuals presently
confronting deprivation or distress may be owed remedy by the Spanish government.
While this model rules out a blanket extension of Spanish citizenship to all descendants
of the expelled Sephardim and Moriscos, it could, however, justify a blanket extension of
Spanish citizenship to Saharawis, stateless members of the “refugee nation” created by
Spanish colonialism and stuck without resources in camps in Algeria. Their present political and economic suﬀering grounds a stronger claim to citizenship that overcomes the
non-identity and generalization problems confronting the other two models for responsibility for the past.

Notes
1. I describe these as liberal models, since each assumes the ideal liberal norm of respecting all
individuals as free and equal beings. Individuals, groups, or states incur responsibility for the
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past when they violate that ideal by failing to treat individuals as free or equal, thereby
requiring some contemporary response in order to come into compliance with liberal normative standards.
2. A later Spanish government in 2019 refused to apologize for the colonization of Latin
America, even though that occurred after the expulsion of the Sephardim (Lafuente and
Abellán 2019).
3. All translations from Spanish are my own.
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